THE KARABAKH CONFLICT: IS THERE A WAY OUT?

THE KARABAKH CONFLICT: IS THERE A WAY OUT?

Introduction

In I996, according to Margareta Sollenberg and Peter Wallensteen there were at least 27 large-scale armed clashes in 24 hot spots across the world. The Swedish experts on conflicts describe as a large-scale armed conflict any clash that goes on for a long time, involves armed forces of two or more states or a government and an organized armed group, and causes a loss of over 1,000 lives.

I regret to say that the Karabakh conflict fits all the above qualifications. Its sad results are only too well known. According to incomplete data over 30 thousand died on both sides between 1988 and 1994. Despite the cease-fire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan 116 died and 366 were wounded between May 1994 and April 1997. This is the most cruel and destructive conflict in Europe at the end of the twentieth century.

From the scholarly point of view the conflict can be described as typically irredentist, that is, a territorial dispute. They are known all over the world and put into a nutshell by an epigraph to Susan Woodward's Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War: "Why should I be a minority in your state when you can be a minority in mine?" The Serbs and the Croats displayed irredentism when they fought over Bosnia enclaves in which both Serbs and Croats used to live. Violence and ethnic purges were seen as absolutely justified by the aim. Slovenia, another former Yugoslavian republic, avoided conflict developments when detaching itself from the rest of the formerly united country mainly because the larger part of Slovenians lived within their ethnic boundaries-there were small numbers of them scattered elsewhere.

In Hungary real or potential irredentism could be seen in relation to Rumania with a considerable Hungarian minority; Albania looked at Kosovo as its irridenta; Pakistan, at Jammu and Kashmir.

In the Caucasus Karabakh and Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan, Javakhetia in Georgia and Kars in Turkey are all irridentas claimed by Armenia as the "legal heir" of the so-called Greater Armenia.

We lost Nagorny Karabakh and seven adjacent districts (Lachin, Kelbajar, Agdam, Fizuli, Jebrail. Gubadly, and Zangilan) that make 20 percent of our territory in the campaign of 1992-1994. It is for five years now that the warring sides have been living under cease-fire, that is, neither war nor peace. The conflict has been frozen-diplomacy is at work.

What should be understood by a conflict resolution? Why does the Karabakh conflict defy an easy solution?

To answer this question we should first specify certain terms. In the latter half of the 1980s conflictology acquired a number of new terms: conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution. and conflict transformation. The strategies the terms describe are associated with four stages and can be very effective.

Prevention is aimed at containing the conflict within the political limits and at removing all factors conducive to violence. Conflict management calls for diplomatic efforts to stop violence that has already developed to return the conflict into its political boundaries.
Resolution is another stage of conflict development that mostly depends on sides involved and pre- supposes a quest for a mutually acceptable politically practicable solution. The Karabakh conflict has reached this stage.

Resolution of similar conflicts is often complicated by outside factors: The sides (governments and nations) are not prepared to make a responsible decision and reach a consensus. The victorious side tends to forget that its gains are anything but temporary, that force invites the use of force and that the conflict may flare up after a short lull. Third countries and international organizations acting as intermediaries may not be interested in quenching the conflict.

The above factors are all present in the Karabakh conflict the resolution of which is further complicated by the region's key geostrategic importance in which the interests of regional and world powers clash. This probably explains the idea frequently aired in the Western press that both sides involved in the conflict do not want a resolution and are content with "neither war nor peace'' situation (See Michael Ochs, "The Current Situation in Nagorno-Karabakh", OSCE Digest, December 1998.) Recently scholarly writings have been enriched with a new term "conflict transformation" to describe a lengthy process of establishing positive relationships between the former foes. More often than not authors refer to the Franco-German relationships within certain institutions that finally developed into the European Union.

Yet one can point to different developments such as "creeping annexation" Israel is pursuing on the occupied Arab territories where it is building military settlements. This is what Armenia may profit from. Time has come to analyze the situation in detail and to point to possible exits.

The Major Points and Possible Options

Before we start looking for an exit we should enumerate the major points:

The Karabakh-related problems are of vital importance for Azerbaijan yet we should never forget that the outside world sees it as one among others.

I am not going to discuss military or military-political options. In fact it is bad manners for a conflict expert to discuss them lest this be interpreted as war-mongering. At the same time everybody knows that the use of force predominates under certain circumstances and may even produce desirable results. It seems that the Gulf wars and the Balkan crisis will give birth to new conflict-related theories. One can expect that both conflicts will be described as yielding to force alone. It is no secret that Armenia and certain circles in third countries are using the so-called post-1994 military-political realities (plainly speaking, Armenian occupation of Nagorny Karabakh and adjacent districts) to put pressure on Az-erbaijan. Through diplomatic efforts Azerbaijan has won the world community on its side yet one can hardly expect that international organizations ("having lost patience") will be prepared to resolutely move against Armenia or apply military-political sanctions. This is next to impossible for several reasons: the conflict started during Soviet times when it was out of the reach of international commu-nity as a U.S.S.R.'s domestic problem. This explains why the notorious resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia on reunification of the Armenian S.S.R. with Nagorny Karabakh adopted in December 1989 was shelved when Armenia became independent to be replaced with a new interpretation of Nagorny Karabakh's independence. This added new, and very important meaning, to the conflict. As a subject of international law Armenia was no longer eager to be directly involved in the conflict. It rather preferred to provide political and military support to the Karabakh Armenians now fighting under a new banner of complete independence. The policy is still bearing fruit. No matter whether Azerbaijan decides to use military force against Karabakh or not, the very presence of a battle-worthy army and a threat of its use are the most convincing arguments against the "military-political realities." World experience has repeatedly confirmed that this may bring a prompt resolution of a conflict.

The article will not go into details of what the Minsk OSCE Group has been doing since February 1992 when it started elaborating an all-embracing model of the conflict settlement. One has to point out, however, that an absence of a mechanism of coercion in the OSCE peace-keeping efforts, and an existing mechanism of decision-making based on a consensus prevent from reaching specific decisions on the Karabakh issue.

When trying to resolve the conflict we should never let out the humanitarian aspect and the appalling conditions in which the refugees and forced migrants are living. According to the September 1997 propositions supplied by the co-chairpersons of the Minsk Group it was planned to liberate six occu-pied districts (except Shusha and Lachin districts) as the first stage of settlement. Refugees should have been returned to their homes, transport communications unblocked. Later, the problems of two districts were to be resolved and the status of Nagorny Karabakh determined. In October 1997 the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia reached an agreement on these propositions in Strasbourg. This could have served a basis for renewed negotiations within the Minsk Group and a just and wise solution of the problems of those who suffered in the conflict. Unfortunately, the new Armenian leaders tie the humanitarian aspects and the future status of Nagomy Karabakh together.

The new Armenian leaders insist that Nagorny Karabakh should participate in the direct talks with Azerbaijan. This trick just complicates the entire process. Everybody knows that even if Azerbaijan shifts its position the opposite side will not reciprocate.

With all pros and cons considered one should be absolutely convinced that the variant under discussion will bring the conflict's final resolution.

The above testifies that the status of Nagorny Karabakh is the key to the entire situation. Let's discuss three theoretically possible variants of the status: an autonomy within Azerbaijan, confederation with Azerbaijan, and independence from Azerbaijan.

Autonomy

Recently Ruth Lapidoth supplied her own interpretation of the territorial-political autonomy as a structure given to a group that differs from the country's majority but is in a majority in a specific region. This is an instrument through which the group can express its identity (See. Ruth Lapidoth. Autonomy Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, United States Institute of Peace, 1997, p. 33.). The author goes on to say that the main mechanism of instituting autonomy calls for redistribution of powers among the center and the au-tonomy. The autonomy may enjoy wide powers: normally, the problems of security and international relations are not delegated though, in some cases, an autonomy may become a party to an international agreement or a member of an international organization if the center says so. For example, the Aland Islands are a member of the Northern Council and may conclude agreements with the Council's members when approved by the President of Finland.

The world experience of various types of autonomies is wide enough yet Armenia has taken the extreme position. It rejects this option by saying that status quo ante bellum would be a step back in conflict settlement. Karabakh has autonomy which was not wide enough. They are not prepared to enter into any vertically arranged relations with Azerbaijan - something that an autonomy presupposes. The Armenian side accuses Azerbaijan of ignoring the military-political realities, the new alignment of forces and the war's results. It says that Azerbaijan cannot offer any protection to the Armenian population and is just seeking to restore the old order.

Armenia has supplied another, not quite important argument against the autonomy: it says that the Azerbaijanian side has so far failed to forward specific propositions about its content. Indeed, there is a lot of work for Azerbaijan's diplomats and experts in international law.

Naturally enough, the vertical relations can be improved. One of the promising variants was put forward in 1994 by John Maresca, U.S. special representative at the talks on Nagorny Karabakh. Ruth Lapidoth writes that such an arrangement can be reached on the sides' mutual agreement. The side with the associated statehood enjoys complete domestic self-determination, that is, rules itself according to its own constitution. The state with which the associated relations are established preserve, on mutual consent, certain powers. Normally, these would be international relations and defense and security.

This will not give Nagorny Karabakh its independence, there would be still a vertical of subordination to Azerbaijan yet the conflict will persist at least partially because of the triadic relational nexus between Armenia with its both external national Diaspora and homeland politics, Nagorny-Karabakh and Azerbaijan.

All pro and contra of the autonomy idea carry both positive and negative factors for Azerbaijan. The pro is territorial integrity and minimal concessions. This is what the world community wants in principle - for the territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers are much more preferable than the hazards of the self-determination principle. The contra is Azerbaijan's continued financial responsibilities for the region that would enjoy wide powers. According to some estimates today Nagorny Karabakh can pay for 40 percent of its needs - the rest is supplied by Armenia. Second, Azerbaijan will have to exert enormous efforts to build up new relations with Karabakh.

Confederation - the Road to Complete Independence

In November 1998 the Minsk Group suggested a new variant of settlement that would create horizontal relationships between Karabakh and Azerbaijan. Armenia liked it because it would, in its opinion, to remove the allegedly existing contradiction between the principle of territorial integrity and the right to self-determination. The new option presupposed that Azerbaijan would abandon "all preliminary conditions" (read: its territorial integrity). The Armenian side is convinced that the option is rooted in the new military-political realities, Karabakh's de facto independence and its close ties with Armenia. Azerbaijan had no choice but to reject the option as unacceptable and contradictory.

It should be said that confederations are few and far between in the world today. The Swiss Confederation that existed between 1848 and 1874 (when it was transformed into a federation) is one of the most typical examples. The United Arab Republic founded by Egypt and Syria in 1958 is another instructive case of a confederation that died several years later, in 1961, when Syria withdrew from it.

Facts have amply demonstrated that confederations are artificial structures unable to survive for long. As such they cannot be recommended. A confederation between Azerbaijan and Karabakh stands little chance of implementation: it will inevitably turn into a transition period on the road to Karabakh's complete independence.

Obviously, Azerbaijan does not find the prospect tempting; if realized the option may provide hazardous patterns for the entire Southern Caucasus.

Is There Any Alternative?

The conflicting sides regard these options as the most acceptable compromises. Yet they are contradictory and mutually exclusive.

In the past, there were enough contradictions when this autonomous region was formed in Azerbaijan. Indeed, why did Armenia get Zangezur after fierce territorial disputes while Azerbaijan retained Karabakh and Nakhichevan? Historians in both countries cannot agree on many points yet they have common opinions about the role of Russia. Paul Gable, a prominent American political scientist, identified at least three important steps "the Soviet Union under Stalin had made to divide and conquer" the Armenians and Azeris. This was mainly related to drawing up frontiers between them. He writes that Azerbaijan was separated from Turkey and could no longer maintain contacts across land. Second, consid-erable Armenian and Azeri minorities were preserved in both states. Third, the Armenian Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region was set up under Azerbaijan's jurisdiction and an Azerbaijanian Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic was created in Armenia (See: P. Goble, "Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis."The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. XVI, No.2, Summer 1992. p.21.). This provides a clear idea of Russia's role in the process. The author provides a settlement plan that, if realized, will remove these contradictions. The countries should swap territories: part of Zangezur is returned to Azerbaijan which in this way gets access to Nakhichevan, while part of Nagorny Karabakh is given to Armenia. Each of the sides have to retreat a bit to reach the desired peace.

Both sides are critical of the option yet their remarks are of psychological rather than principal nature. One thing is clear, though: this rational and integrated approach can lay the foundation of a lasting peace and security in the region and to prevent any ethnic conflicts in future.

Conclusion

Obviously, none of the options is fully welcome yet none of the sides profits from the continued crisis.

The recent meeting of both countries' presidents in Geneva can be described as an important step toward the conflict settlement. There should be more meetings of the presidents, their representatives, diplomats, and experts on the permanent basis. Such talks may discuss any political options based on mutually acceptable balance of national interests of both nations. These interests should precede the more general principles of territorial integrity and self-determination. When reached the agreements should be offered for a referendum or a nation-wide discussion which will guarantee their realization. Everybody knows that in both countries there are certain opposition circles wishing to play the Karabakh card to reach their political aims. The events in Armenia which ended with Levon Ter-Petrossian's removal is just another confirmation of the above.

One should not underestimate external pressure put on Armenia: the country is experiencing Rus-sia's destabilizing influence. Whether it wants this or not Armenia today is the last loyal friend of Rus-sia's in the region. Having opposed itself to Azerbaijan and Turkey Armenia was forced to seek Russia's patronage. The latter employed the situation to place her military bases on the Armenian territory while supplying the country, virtually free of charge, with latest weapons. Russia is using her military presence in Armenia to stem Western and Turkish mounting economic influence in the Transcaucasus.

Today, it is not enough for Azerbaijan to simply reach an agreement with Armenia. They have to find a strong guarantor of it. There is only one country in the world which both sides can trust and which is able to limit Russia's destabilizing influence. This is the United States. They have a rich experience of this sort-the Camp David Agreements and State Secretary Henry Kissinger's role in it.

If Azerbaijan manages to convince Armenia that the United States are the sole reliable guarantor we may acquire a real chance of leaving behind all the Karabakh complications for ever.

© Central Asia and the Caucasus, No 2, 2000
Gulshen PASHAYEVA
(Ph.D., assistant professor, Director, Center of Conflict Studies-Azerbaijan)